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Pre-objective Depth in Merleau-Ponty 
and Jackson Pollock
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Trinity University
Abstract
Pollock’s drip technique generated certain unconventional representational possibilities, includ-
ing the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective involvement of an embodied, intentional sub-
ject in a perceptual world. Consequently, Pollock’s art can be understood to explore or investigate 
the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellectual consciousness. His painting—here I 
consider Number 1, 1949—motivates viewers to consider the relationship between intention and 
meaning as it appears in both primordial and reflective dimensions of experience. The account 
proceeds in three stages. First, I review key features of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the pre-
objective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by considering his analysis 
of Paul Cézanne’s technique. Second, I consider Pollock’s technique and some critical responses 
to it, while analyzing some of its implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine 
the perceptual efffects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty’s lead, in 
view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and intention.
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[W]e have to rediscover beneath [objectifĳied] depth . . . a primordial depth, which confers 
upon it its signifĳicance, and which is the thickness of a medium devoid of any thing.1
[D]escription is not the return to immediate experience; one never returns to immediate 
experience. It is only a question of whether we are to try to understand it.2
1) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Rout-
ledge, 1962), 266; hereafter cited as PP, followed by page number in the text. 
2) Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences”, in The Pri-
macy of Perception (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 12–42, here 30.
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Introduction
The historical coincidence of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and 
the representational practices of Abstract Expressionist artists such as Barnett 
Newman and Jackson Pollock has often been noted, but the possible implica-
tions of the connection for interpretation have only occasionally been pursued 
in a sustained manner.3 The parallel development of the careers of these two 
fĳigures is remarkable. Both Pollock (1912–1956) and Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) 
attempted to resist and to negate the conventional conceptions governing our 
understanding of perception and representation. For Merleau-Ponty, this 
meant momentarily “break[ing] with our familiar acceptance” of our “natural 
attitude,” one generated by powerful, but suspect, theoretical presuppositions 
about how we supposedly perceive the world.4 For Pollock, it meant suspend-
ing powerful cultural presuppositions about how paintings depict the world, 
and it meant investigating—via a radical technique—the form and content of 
representational practices. For both, it meant rejecting an “objective” view-
point in order to comprehend the genesis of meaning in and through a sub-
ject’s embodied perception. The goal of this paper is to explore how 
Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to describe phenomenologically the “pre-objective,” 
“pre-reflective” or “primordial” depth that funds reflective thought might illu-
minate Pollock’s analogous efffort to express that depth pictorially.5 
3) Exceptions include Michael Fried, “Three American Painters,” in Art and Objecthood (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 213–68; Wayne J. Froman, “Action Painting and the World-
As-Picture,” in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, ed. G. A. Johnson (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1993), 337–47; Yve-Alain Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” in Painting as Model 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 186–211; Paul Crowther, “Barnett Newman and the Sublime,” in The 
Language of Twentieth-Century Art: A Conceptual History (New Haven and London: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1997), 149–63; and Galen A. Johnson, “The Invisible and the Unrepresentable: Barnett 
Newman’s Abstract Expressionism and the Aesthetics of Merleau-Ponty,” Analecta Husserliana 
75 (2002): 179–89. See also Amelia Jones, “Meaning, Identity, Embodiment: The Uses of Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology in Art History,” in Art and Thought, ed. D. Arnold and M. Iversen (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003), 72–90.
4) Merleau-Ponty, of course, acknowledges that this suspension is never total: “The most impor-
tant lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” 
(PP, xiv).
5) Although the term “fund” might seem to call for a particular technical defĳinition, I am using it 
to suggest the general idea of a resource upon which an individual draws—not necessarily con-
sciously—for the purposes of establishing the immediate qualitative unity of the present. As I will 
discuss momentarily, Merleau-Ponty speaks of an “unreflective fund of experience” that reflective 
thought presupposes. It is possible to think of a fund as the sum total of interactions or experi-
ences undergone or accumulated by the individual over time, experiences that might leave their 
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My thesis is that Pollock’s development of the drip, pour, and spatter tech-
nique in the years around 1947–50 generated certain unconventional represen-
tational possibilities, including the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective 
involvement of an embodied, intentional subject in a perceptual world.6 
Pollock, I will suggest, thus discovered the means by which he could explore or 
investigate pictorially the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellec-
tual consciousness. Consequently, his painting—here I limit myself to an 
account of Number 1, 1949 (Figure 1)—motivates viewers to consider the rela-
tionship between intention and meaning as it appears in both primordial and 
reflective dimensions of experience. The account proceeds broadly in three 
stages. First, I review key features of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the pre-
objective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by con-
sidering his analysis of Paul Cézanne’s technique. Second, I consider Pollock’s 
technique and some critical responses to it, while also analyzing some of its 
implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine the perceptual 
efffects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty’s lead, in 
view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and 
intention.
mark in conscious memory or in unconscious habits of thought, behavior, or feeling. My use of 
the term resonates with how it is employed by John Dewey, who referred throughout his writings 
to “funded” experience and meaning, but nevertheless avoided defĳining it precisely. For useful 
discussions, see Stephen C. Pepper, “The Concept of Fusion in Dewey’s Aesthetic Theory,” Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 12, no. 2 (December 1953): 169–76, and Philip M. Zeltner, John Dew-
ey’s Aesthetic Philosophy (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1975), esp. 11–13.
6) A comment on these two terms—representation and expression—seems called for. I use 
“representation” in a general sense to refer to what an artist achieves when he or she gives form 
to experience (or thought, or feeling) through a medium (obviously, in this sense, representation 
has nothing to do with whether a painting is fĳigurative or abstract). I want to distinguish my use 
of this term from representation understood as the classical mimetic paradigm in which thought 
and language are taken to represent an objective reality (a paradigm Merleau-Ponty struggled to 
defeat). As for “expression,” my general sense of the term—and the meaning I hope my use of it 
carries—is informed by Lawrence Hass, who stresses that for Merleau-Ponty, expression was an 
operation “whereby some overwhelming initial form, fĳigure, datum, or image, is creatively trans-
formed and reorganized in a way that radiates new meaning or insight, and which brings a strong 
feeling of necessity” (Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008], 
160).
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I
The Pre-objective World 
Soon after Pollock’s death in a car crash in 1956, a number of philosophers 
debated Merleau-Ponty’s concept of a pre-objective world, a concept he had 
begun to fully develop in Phenomenology of Perception.7 Broadly speaking, 
Merleau-Ponty theorizes the pre-objective world to counter both empiricist 
and rationalist approaches to perception, which “reduce all phenomena which 
bear witness to the union of subject and world, putting in their place the clear 
idea of the object as in itself and of the subject as pure consciousness. [Objec-
tive thinking] therefore severs the links [that] unite the thing and the embod-
ied subject” (PP, 320). If science assumes and describes such an objective world, 
despite or even in the face of the modes of appearance that Merleau-Ponty is at 
pains to describe, then his concept of the pre-objective world can be under-
stood as an attempt to critique the natural attitude and to establish a genetic 
phenomenology that explains the ways in which embodied perception oper-
ates in the world before it is measured, analyzed, or described by scientifĳic 
discourse.
The pre-objective world is characterized by fundamental intentional bonds 
between subject and world that account for the immediate perceptual unity of 
that world and that fund—but are intertwined with—higher order reflexive, 
conceptual, or linguistic meanings.8 The pre-objective or primordial intention-
ality of consciousness is a general directedness towards the world that is the 
condition for meaning. Understood along these lines, the idea of pre-objective 
7) See Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor, “The Pre-Objective World,” in Essays in Phenomenol-
ogy, ed. M. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofff, 1966), 116–36; Thomas Munson, “The Pre-
Objective Reconsidered,” Review of Metaphysics 12 (1958/59): 624–32; and H. L. Dreyfus and 
S. J. Todes, “The Three Worlds of Merleau-Ponty,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22, 
no. 4 (June 1962): 559–65. My understanding of the place of the pre-objective in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology in indebted to broad reading of the work of numerous scholars, among them: 
John Bannan, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967); John 
Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1973); 
Samuel B. Mallin, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); Gary 
Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981); M. C. 
Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988); and M. M. 
Langer, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary (Tallahassee: 
Florida State University Press, 1989).
8) Merleau-Ponty does not accord temporal priority to this primary layer of existence. On this 
point, see J. C. Berendzen, “Coping Without Foundations,” International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 18, no. 5 (2010): 629–49.
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intentionality provides a counterweight to intellectualist positions that hold 
intentionality to be a matter of judgment or positing thought. Instead, it can be 
thought of as an “operative intentionality,” in the sense of Edmund Husserl’s 
“fungierende Intentionalität,” a kind of primordial contact felt by a “lived body” 
of an original and material bond between the subject and the world.9 Because 
this intentionality is manifest as the lived body’s concrete, spatial, and 
motile directedness to the world, meaning is an inherent possibility of our 
experience. 
To clarify the intentional nature of the primordial bonds that bind the 
embodied subject to the world, Merleau-Ponty famously analyzes the experi-
ence of the phantom limb—in which he takes a patient’s felt persistence of a 
missing appendage to be a certain refusal of its absence—to suggest that the 
lived body, properly understood, is not simply an object, but is rather a mode 
of inhabiting the world: “We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in 
space, or in time. It inhabits space and time. Consciousness is being-towards-
the thing through the intermediary of the body” (PP, 138–39).10 The embodied 
subject of primary perception is intentional (i.e., directed) but is not yet pres-
ent to himself as a reflective or intellectual consciousness. Merleau-Ponty calls 
this subject “the anonymous one buried in the world” and asserts that it has a 
“global and inarticulate grasp upon the world.”11 In taking a “pre-conscious 
possession of the world,” the body-subject enters into a primordial reciprocity 
with the world in which subject and object mutually come into being 
(PP, 298).
Genetic phenomenology illuminates the process by which a self-conscious, 
reflective subject emerges from the anonymity of the pre-conscious, pre-
objective world. “The task of a radical reflection,” Merleau-Ponty wrote, 
“consists, paradoxically enough, in recovering the unreflective experience of 
the world”:
What have we then at the outset? . . . [A] certain perceptual fĳield against the background 
of a world. Nothing here is thematized. Neither object nor subject is  posited. . . . [P]rimary 
perception is a non-thetic, pre-objective and pre-conscious experience. . . . It is in the experi-
ence of the thing [within this primordial fĳield] that the reflective ideal of positing thought 
has its basis. [R]eflection does not itself grasp its full signifĳicance unless it refers to the 
 9) On the relationship to Husserl, see Martina Reuter, “Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Pre-Reflective 
Intentionality,” Synthese 118, no. 1 (January, 1999): 69–88.
10) Sentence order modifĳied. 
  11)  Merleau-Ponty, “Working Notes,” in The Visible and the Invisible, ed. C. Lefort, trans. A. Lingis 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 201; and in PP, 404, respectively. 
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unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and which con-
stitutes for it a kind of original past, a past which has never been a present. (PP, 241–42)12
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology analyzes embodied perception in order to 
return intellectual consciousness to the roots of unreflective experience that 
funds and gives value to its higher order constructions. It recursively discovers 
an “original past,” one that is not literal but that is posited by a reflective 
consciousness. 
The Originality of Pre-reflective Experience
In the late 1930s and early ’40s, while Merleau-Ponty was systematically dis-
mantling the classical conception of physiological psychology in The Structure 
of Behavior (1942, trans. 1963) and preparing the ground for his analysis of 
embodied perception in Phenomenology of Perception (1945, trans. 1962), 
Pollock was working through a mode of physical realism that he hoped would 
visually stimulate kinesthetic sensations in the viewer through certain compo-
sitional strategies, conveying to them a sense of embodiment. Various scholars 
have ably reviewed the historical and aesthetic contexts of this efffort, which 
found its origins in the teachings of Pollock’s early mentor, Thomas Hart 
Benton, who had theorized about the literal transfer of muscular feeling 
through pictorial composition in the 1920s.13 But, as has often been argued, the 
content of Pollock’s work between 1947–50—during which time he abandoned 
his earlier modes of corporeal expression in favor of allover abstraction—
underwent signifĳicant revision, if not radical change. 
While generalizing about the characteristics of Pollock’s allover surfaces 
tends to diminish effforts to put forward interpretations of particular paintings, 
it is also the case that a broad view of shared features helps establish the 
12) Emphasis added. The last sentence reads in the original: “La réflexion ne saisit donc elle-
même son sens plein que si elle mentionne le fonds irréfléchi qu’elle présuppose, dont elle pro-
fĳite, et qui constitue pour elle comme un passé originel, un passé qui n’a jamais été présent” 
(Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception [Paris: Gallimard, 1945], 280).
13) Thomas Hart Benton, “The Mechanics of Form Organization, Parts I–V,” The Arts (November–
March, 1926). For a recent analysis, see Barbara Jafffee, “Jackson Pollock’s Industrial Expression-
ism,” Art Journal 63, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 68–79. Other sources for Pollock’s commitment to 
physical realism included the Mexican muralists, most notably José Clemente Orozco and David 
Alfaro Siqueiros, Native American art, and, of course, the legacy of European modernism, particu-
larly Pablo Picasso. For an overview of many of these connections, see Ellen Landau, Jackson 
Pollock (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1989); and Stephen Polcari, Abstract Expressionism and the 
Modern Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
56 M. Schreyach / Research in Phenomenology 43 (2013) 49–70
painter’s intentions for some of their basic efffects. The technique of dripping 
or pouring paint on a horizontally laid canvas from its fours sides was a means 
for Pollock to cover it with a multitude of marks, maximizing the number of 
interrelationships between them, and yielding, in Michael Fried’s description, 
a “layered impactedness, mobile intensiveness, and experiential density of the 
painted surface.”14 The simultaneous avoidance of defĳinitively closed shapes or 
outlines produces an image resistant to stable fĳigure-ground relationships, 
challenging—and perhaps ultimately inhibiting—the viewer’s achievement of 
visual equilibrium (understood broadly as the reduction of tension between 
the viewer and the perceptual fĳield, in this case, a visual, painted one). This 
thwarting of visual equilibrium has implications for how we interpret the 
modes of experience or consciousness Pollock’s paintings express. Consider 
the point that Merleau-Ponty posits a body-subject who fĳirst experiences only 
a general directedness—an operative intentionality—towards the world 
through a primordial intentionality, but who subsequently comes to under-
stand his or her subjectivity as generated in reciprocity with some stabilized 
fĳield of fĳigure-ground relations. Because the key perceptual efffects of Pollock’s 
work are closely related to this basic destabilization of fĳigure-ground, consider-
ing the issue closely will ultimately help explain how his technique, and the 
pictorial fĳields it generates, can be interpreted as facilitating a viewer’s recogni-
tion of the pre-objective conditions of reflective consciousness, and the pri-
mordial intentionality that subtends the emergence of the subject. 
Although Merleau-Ponty never wrote about Pollock, he addressed fĳigure-
ground relations in “Cézanne’s Doubt” (1945). In that essay, he presented the 
artist as a kind of phenomenologist, working against the assumptions of the 
natural attitude and carrying out his own form of critique of objectivism. 
Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty observed, distinguished between “the spontaneous 
organization of the things we perceive and the human organization of ideas 
and sciences.”15 His project responds to this division:
We see things; we agree about them; we are anchored in them; and it is with “nature” as our 
base that we construct our sciences. Cézanne wanted to paint this primordial world. . . . He 
wanted to put intelligence, ideas, science, perspective, and tradition back in touch with the 
world of nature . . . “from which they came.” (CD, 13–14)
14) Michael Fried, “Optical Allusions,” Artforum 37 (April 1999): 97–101, 143, and 146; here 97.
15) Merleau-Ponty, “Cézanne’s Doubt” [1945], J. Wild, ed., Sense and Non-Sense (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1964), 16; hereafter cited as CD followed by page number in the text.
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Looking at his paintings, a beholder experiences “the impression of an emerg-
ing order, of an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes” 
(CD, 14). This is a “lived perspective” that contrasts with a “geometric or photo-
graphic one” of the objectifĳied world, and results in part from Cézanne’s ten-
dency to resist clear distinctions between fĳigure and ground (“He did not want 
to separate the stable things which we see and the shifting way in which they 
appear” [CD, 13–14]). A key technical feature operates to complicate fĳigure-
ground relations, namely, the consistency of Cézanne’s application of short, 
near-parallel brushstrokes over a range of depicted objects, from patches of 
landscape, to buildings, to foliage, even to the sky. The overall efffect of 
Cézanne’s touch is to collapse distinctions between background and fore-
ground areas, since they share equal tactile, and thus visual, weight. Such phys-
ical regularity can be so insistent that it undermines the pictorial illusionism of 
the scene.16 The visual complexity generates an undecidable oscillation or 
pulse between fĳigure and ground. The efffect yields an impression of “matter as 
it takes on form, the birth of order through spontaneous organization” 
(CD, 13).
The signifĳicance of these pictorial efffects for phenomenological inquiry 
becomes clearer when we consider them in light of Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
establish the originality of pre-reflective experience.17 For Merleau-Ponty, a 
chief task of genetic phenomenology, as the name implies, is to investigate 
origins, “re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endow-
ing that contact with a philosophical status” (PP, vii). “[R]adical reflection,” he 
continues, “amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflec-
tive life which is its initial situation” (PP, xiv). An immediate problem presents 
itself: since the nature of the origin must be discerned by thought, thought 
(however radical) confronts the difffĳiculty of establishing the originality of 
something that escapes it.18 The non-discursive nature of painting, however, 
might enable an artist to express the primordial beginnings of reflective 
16) Richard Shifff has done the most to elaborate the signifĳicance Cézanne’s technique. For his 
discussion on Merleau-Ponty and Cézanne, see “Cézanne’s Physicality: The Politics of Touch,” in 
The Language of Art History, ed. S. Kemal and I. Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 129–180; esp. 150–54.
17) My points here are indebted to my reading of Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Begin-
nings.
18) Sallis asks: “How is the reflection, which takes as its task the illumination of what is intrinsi-
cally opaque to reflection, to understand itself, and what kind of thematization of that primordial 
stratum which it seeks to penetrate can appropriately be demanded of it?” (Phenomenology and 
the Return to Beginnings, 40).
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thought, the “ante-predicative life of consciousness” (PP, xv), in a way that 
absorbs the paradox, accepting its recoil (as Merleau-Ponty’s own writing aims 
to do). 
But it is vital to acknowledge that the peculiar character of the artist’s expres-
sion, like the phenomenologist’s description, is reflexive. Cézanne’s lived per-
spective is not actually experienced by a viewer in looking at the painting; that 
perspective is held in suspension, rendered pictorial. It is represented. The 
painter “freeze[s] these distortions [of the lived perspective] in repainting 
them on canvas; [he] stop[s] the spontaneous movement in which they pile up 
in perception” (CD, 14). This “freezing” is the condition for us to reflect on the 
meaning of the world of primordial perception, that “insurpassable plentitude” 
that for Merleau-Ponty is the “real” (CD, 15). If Cézanne’s work “reveals the base 
of inhuman nature upon which man has installed himself,” it does so because 
“only a human being is capable of such a vision which penetrates right to the 
root of things beneath the imposed order of humanity” (CD, 16). There is a 
fundamental reflexivity in Merleau-Ponty’s project: the return to origins is not 
a literal one, for it is only from the point of view of the originated that the origin 
comes into focus. Cézanne’s paintings recursively express pre-reflective expe-
rience, revealing the ground of our knowledge to be the “primordial historicity” 
of the lived body and the “ ‘there is’ which underlies [scientifĳic thinking].”19 
Since that world exists only from a human perspective, we might understand 
Cézanne’s expressive act—conveyed by his mode of pictorial address—as an 
attempt to discover the pre-objective conditions of reflective thought, its 
intentional self-grounding. Stated in another way, Cézanne expresses the rela-
tionship of pre-reflective to reflective experience in order to show us the con-
ditions for creating meaning while creating it.
II
The Interpretation of Origins and Depth
In a slightly diffferent sense of the term, investigating primordial “origins” as a 
platform for interpreting Abstract Expressionism has encouraged some schol-
ars, drawing on phenomenology, to suggest that some artworks actually instan-
tiate for a beholder an experience of the pre-reflective dimension of experience, 
in which objective categories of thought have not yet appeared and where 
19) Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in The Primacy of Perception, 160–161. 
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subject and object appear merged. In his discussion of Barnett Newman, for 
instance, Yve-Alain Bois fĳinds Onement I (1948) to “actualize . . . something like 
an ‘originary perception’,” or “our birth-to-the-world.”20 Similarly, in a study of 
Mark Rothko, James Breslin suggests that the painter’s works “travel back to 
give us subjectivity in the process of forming, prior to language, prior to the ‘fall’ 
into hard boundaries.”21 The philosopher Galen Johnson suggests that New-
man’s works help the viewer overcome, through the apprehension of a beauty 
that “transcends the subject-object dichotomy,” nothing less than the “philo-
sophical dualism of subject and object [that] underlies the divisions in West-
ern civilization between spirit and matter, self and world, mind and body.”22 
(Similarly, Merleau-Ponty found that Cézanne’s work “returns to just that pri-
mordial experience from which these notions [the distinctions of soul and 
body, thought and vision] are derived and in which they are inseparable” 
[CD, 16]). Within this originary condition, the connection of the lived body to 
the world of primary perception is so close that the idea of two separate realms 
of experience, subjective and objective, threatens to become meaningless. 
More recently, the art historian T. J. Clark has suggested that painting, in 
Pollock’s hands, “might be able to put itself in a diffferent relation to the world. 
To be ‘in’ it, or ‘of ’ it, in ways which twist the familiar prepositions back on 
themselves.”23 In discussing One: Number 31, 1950, Clark writes:
What was to be signifĳied by the interlace now was the logic of a certain way of dealing with 
the world. . . . And yet this was clearly a kind of dealing that, given [the world’s] existence at 
the edge of our normal categories, could only be pictured as “something like pure, disem-
bodied energy.” What shall we call it, this mode of experience? Vestigial? Immediate? Unfĳig-
ured? Unfounded? (ibid., 334)
It is central to Clark’s account that this mode of experience—whatever we call 
it—is “signifĳied” (not lived or actually experienced). Instead, it is seen from the 
perspective of the “ruling symbolic regimes” of culture (ibid., 336). As a 
20) Bois, “Perceiving Newman,” 195.
21)   James Breslin, “Out of the Body: Mark Rothko’s Paintings,” in The Body Imaged, ed. K. Adler 
and M. Pointon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43–52; 49.
22) Galen A. Johnson, The Retrieval of the Beautiful (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2010), 5. Johnson is not specifĳically talking about Pollock here, but his epigraph (a quote by New-
man) suggests that the idea could apply to him.
23) T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 333. Here, Clark quotes Fried, “Jackson Pollock,” in Jackson Pollock: Interviews, 
Articles, and Reviews, ed. P. Karmel (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1999), 98; hereafter cited 
as JPI.
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“wilderness,” it is a space that is unoccupied by symbolic order; paradoxically, 
it is recognized as wilderness only through the symbolic.24 Like Clark, I think it 
would be wrong to consider Pollock’s work as somehow giving us direct access 
to a content that is putatively beyond (or before) representation—that it is 
literally im-mediate. To make the mediated nature of the phenomenological 
description of pre-objective depth clear, Merleau-Ponty reminds us: “[W]e dis-
cover the unreflected. But the unreflected we go back to is not that which is 
prior to philosophy or prior to reflection. It is the unreflected which is under-
stood and conquered by reflection.”25 Pre-reflective experience, it deserves 
repeating, is “a past which has never been a present.” It must be represented in 
order to be interpreted. 
Still, there is a tendency, or a temptation, to speak of Pollock’s paintings—as 
well as his technique of making them—as establishing so powerful a continu-
ity between artist and his activity or between viewer and painting that the dis-
tinction between them collapses, leaving only an anti-representational 
immediacy called, in the gestalt psychologist Anton Ehrenzweig’s memorable 
phrase, “undiffferentiated oceanic envelopment.”26 Pollock perhaps sanctioned 
such views in his account of being “in” his paintings, of having “contact” with 
them, and of feeling as if he were a “part” of them.27 Early critics followed the 
artist’s lead in emphasizing this bond. In 1950, Bruno Alfĳieri wrote that “Pollock 
has broken all barriers between his picture and himself: his picture is the most 
immediate and spontaneous painting. Each one . . . is part of himself.”28 In his 
1959 monograph, the poet Frank O’Hara extended this measure of indivisibility 
to the viewer’s experience of Pollock’s imagery. A viewer apprehends a “one-
ness which has no need for the mediation of metaphor or symbol.”29 Anna 
Chave fĳinds “[t]he efffect of Pollock’s classic poured and drip paintings [to be] 
cosmic or oceanic, like the infĳinity of the universe.”30 These evaluations 
24) Clark writes: “There is a kind of experience, these pictures say, that is vestigial, by the looks of 
it—unusable, marginal, uncanny in the limiting sense of the word—but that at least the parent 
culture leaves alone” (Farewell to an Idea, 335–36).
25) Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences,” 19.
26) Anton Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Order of Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 
120. Hereafter HOA, followed by page number.
27) Pollock, “My Painting,” JPI, 17–18.
28) Bruno Alfĳieri, “A Short Statement on the Painting of Jackson Pollock,” JPI, 69.
29) Frank O’Hara, Jackson Pollock (New York: George Braziller, 1959), 29. 
30) Anna C. Chave, “Pollock and Krasner: Script and Postscript,” [1993], in Jackson Pollock: New 
Approaches, ed. K. Varnedoe and P. Karmel (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1999), 262–79; 271 
and 275. 
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suggest a sense of continuity or even merger between painter/viewer and 
painting that circumvents the need for interpretation. For his part, Ehrenzweig 
fĳirmly stressed the feeling that Pollock’s works literally “sucked and enveloped 
the spectator inside the picture plane,” producing a “manic experience of mys-
tic oneness.”31 And although ultimately recuperated by a secondary process 
that confers structure on the indeterminate phenomena, the experience is 
anti-representational enough while it lasts. When one looks at Pollock, 
[t]he surface gestalt lies in ruins, splintered and unfocusable, the undiffferentiated matrix of 
all art lies exposed, and forces the spectator to remain in the oceanic state of the empty stare 
when all diffferentiation is suspended. The pictorial space advances and engulfs him in a 
multi-dimensional unity where inside and outside merge. (HOA, 121) 
While the elimination of subject-object distinctions in these accounts might 
seem to converge on Merleau-Ponty’s sense of pre-reflective experience, they 
nonetheless imply the suspension of the reflective thinking that Merleau-
Ponty theorizes is necessary to rediscover, to “conquer,” the pre-objective. 
And, it runs counter to my claim that in Pollock’s work, the pre-reflective is 
represented—that it is expressed pictorially.
Pictorial Address
It is signifĳicant that Pollock’s own testimony regarding his procedure implies 
an awareness of just this issue. He recognizes a distinction between the enact-
ment of something like primordial perception (on the part of the painter as he 
paints) and the pictorial mediation necessary to express the pre-reflective so 
that it can come into view. The artist explained: 
On the floor, I am more at ease. I feel nearer, more a part of the painting, since this way I can 
walk around it, work from the four sides and literally be in the painting. . . . [But] [w]hen I 
am in my painting, I’m not aware of what I’m doing. It is only after a sort of “get acquainted” 
period that I see what I have been about. . . . It is only when I lose contact with the painting 
that the result is a mess. Otherwise there is pure harmony, an easy give and take.32
Here, Pollock speaks, fĳirst, of a kind of immersion: being “in” the painting both 
literally and metaphorically, even to the point that he is so absorbed in his 
activity that he is “not aware of what [he’s] doing.” Second, he suggests an 
31) Ehrenzweig, HOA, 118–19.
32) Pollock, “My Painting,” JPI, 17–18.
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identifĳication: being “a part of the painting,” in such radical “contact” with it 
that a loss of contact results in failure. Pollock enacts such a proximate connec-
tion between himself (subject) and his painting (object) that the distinctions 
between the two are all but obviated. Yet in opposition to this sense of merger, 
Pollock also refers to experiencing a feeling of reciprocity: “an easy give and 
take.” Unlike identifĳication or merger, reciprocity necessarily implies a trans-
action between two entities that must be considered somewhat distinct from 
one another, even if their mutual exchange constitutes them as entities. Pol-
lock evidently experiences this reciprocity as a balance between painter and 
painting. Finally, there is his description of a “ ‘get acquainted’ period” during 
which he steps back, as if to separate himself completely from his work, in 
order to “see what [he’s] been about;” we might say, to reflect.33 
Recently, Michael Fried has written about this oscillation between merger 
and separation—between identifĳication and reciprocity—in terms that I think 
greatly illuminate Pollock’s practice. Fried (in a discussion of Caravaggio) iden-
tifĳies a “moment,”
of extended duration, of the painter’s engagement in the ongoing, repetitive, partly automa-
tistic act of painting; I call that “moment” immersive, imagining the painter as so caught up, 
so immersed, in this phase of his work on the painting . . . as to be less than fully aware of any 
sharp distinction between the painting and himself[;]34
and he distinguishes it from a second “moment,”
notionally instantaneous, of separating or indeed recoiling from the painting, of becoming 
detached from it, which is to say of no longer being immersed in work on it but rather seeing 
it, taking it in, as if for the fĳirst time; I call that “moment” specular. (MC, 39)
The contrast between the two “moments” (not to be understood as strictly 
chronological) indicates the artist’s achievement in establishing the image as a 
33) As Harry Cooper pointed out to me, it is also possible that the “ ‘get-acquainted’ period” Pol-
lock refers to occurs as the artist is immersed in the activity of painting and would thus be a key 
phase in the dialogic process by which Pollock comes to know what he was trying to 
accomplish.
34) Fried, The Moment of Caravaggio (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 39; 
hereafter cited as MC, followed by page number. The themes of merger and separation (or specu-
larity) run throughout Fried’s works; see especially Courbet’s Realism (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1990). On specularity and merger in the work of Henri Matisse, see Todd Cronan, 
Against Afffective Formalism: Matisse, Bergson, Modernism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2013).
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painting addressed to a beholder reciprocally, in what Fried calls “a relation-
ship of mutual facing” (MC, 39). Pollock’s representation of—and reflection 
on—the pre-reflective occurs pictorially, as a matter of an intentional mode of 
pictorial address. The notion demands a distinction between an object (art-
work) that addresses and a subject (beholder) who is addressed. 
III
Attention, Frame, and Format 
Aspects of Fried’s immersive moment resonate with what I have been describ-
ing as Pollock’s investigation of the pre-reflective. Above, I quoted Merleau-
Ponty describing the lack of distinctions in primary perception, where “neither 
object nor subject is posited” and where a “pre-conscious,” automatistic mode 
of experience obtains. Yet how is a transition to reflection achieved? How does 
the primary perception of an embodied subject transform or develop into 
thought and expression? The reader will have anticipated that I see Number 1, 
1949 as helping to answer these questions. But the answers must be given in 
terms of an interpretation of pictorial and perceptual efffects, using Merleau-
Ponty as a guide. So, in arguing that Number 1, 1949 presents viewers with the 
opportunity to reflect on the pre-objective world, I do not want to imply that 
the painting actually depicts what that world might look like, as if it were a 
view onto some primordial scene. Nor do I want to suggest that it somehow 
permits a beholder literally to experience such a world, as if the act of viewing 
generates an unmediated afffective response to a primordial environment.
The painting is about fĳive feet high and eight and a half feet long, and con-
sists of about seven colors in enamel (mostly white, black, yellow, and alumi-
num but also blue and pink). Pollock applied the white enamel last or nearly 
last, and its fĳilament-like loops and arcs appear as a kind of tracery responding 
to the splotchy spatters of aluminum, yellow, and blue below. Underneath it 
all, but interwoven with everything else, is a staccato web of black pours, spat-
ters, and throws of varying thickness, density, and sheen. It is difffĳicult for a 
viewer to select from the surface any single pictorial incident that seems to 
impinge upon attention more than any other. Additionally, there initially 
appears neither an internal nor external frame of reference according to which 
a viewer might organize the fĳield hierarchically. Like the uniformly dispersed 
pictorial incidents, our eyes’ focus and our mental attention is allover, fĳinding 
no place to rest and centered nowhere in particular (although it is also true 
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that the eye is in some measure guided by the delicate, yet assertive, thrown 
white tracery). When the eyes, eventually tiring of rapid scanning, become less 
intent either on following visual paths or on the difffĳicult task of focusing on 
particulars, the surface appears somewhat degraded, a homogenous milling-
about of flecks and specks. Asked by William Wright in 1950 how an individual 
should look at his work, Pollock replied, “I think they should not look for, but 
look passively.”35 In doing so, we would not yet have begun to discriminate one 
“thing” from another (or indeed, to diffferentiate our “selves” from our environ-
ment): in short, our selective activity, our attention, would not yet have begun 
to play a decisive role in bringing structure to our experience.36
Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of the pre-objective world, and the mode 
of primary perception taking place within it, illuminates aspects of these picto-
rial efffects. In pre-reflective experience, the organism is unable to organize 
objects into a unifĳied perspectival fĳield against which environmental changes 
(such as a modifĳication to the angle from which we view the object due to our 
movement) could be stabilized. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “the sensory fĳield 
[does not remain] stable while the subject perceives. . . . [There is] no univocal 
position, because no spatial framework persists from one perception to 
another” (PP, 29). Additionally, fĳigure-ground distinctions remain persistently 
uncertain or undecided. To explain how we move from this indeterminate 
horizon to the structured world we perceive in lived experience (which is not 
to suggest that our world is not without ambiguity), Merleau-Ponty analyzes 
the concept of attention, which “transform[s]” the primary perceptual fĳield 
and allows consciousness “to be present to its objects”:
The fĳirst operation of attention is, then, to create for itself a fĳield, either perceptual 
or mental, which can be ‘surveyed’ (überschauen), [so that] consciousness does not 
35) Pollock, “Interview with William Wright,” JPI, 20.
36) My description of the homogeneity of the surface and its resultant de-diffferentiation of secure 
fĳigure-ground relationships should not be taken as implying that Pollock actually defeats fĳigure-
ground perception. To do so is an impossibility. In criticizing the concept of an isolatable datum 
of perception, Merleau-Ponty writes: “A fĳigure on a background is . . . the very defĳinition of the 
phenomenon of perception, [it is] that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be per-
ception at all. The perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle [milieu] of something else, it 
always forms part of a ‘fĳield.’ A really homogenous area offfering nothing to be [perceived] cannot 
be given to any perception” (PP, 4). Experimental fĳindings of Gestalt psychology confĳirm that even 
when a subject is placed in a situation where there is a lack of external stimulation (such as in 
front of a blank wall in low level lighting), she will still perceive fĳigures against uniform grounds, 
fĳigures that are often generated by internal somatic events (e.g. heartbeats or breathing). See 
M. C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 60–61.
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correspondingly lose what it has gained and, moreover, [does not] lose itself in the changes 
it brings about. (PP, 29)
If the primary level of experience is characterized by immersion in a percep-
tual fĳield, then attention is the operation that allows a subject to detach herself 
from that fĳield and to assume a specular position in relation to it. Attention, 
moreover, is actively creative, not passively acquisitive. It does not just permit 
our acquiring information about a world that is already constituted before our 
attending to it. Rather, attention achieves a world by responding appropriately, 
but spontaneously, to its solicitations:
[With regard to] the object of attention itself [,] [the act of attention] is literally a question 
of creation. . . . To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to 
bring about a new articulation of [data]. . . . [Attention is] the active constitution of a new 
object which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than 
an indeterminate horizon. (PP, 29–30)
Attention creates. The solicitation of our attention is not, or not merely, caused 
by objects but occurs spontaneously, generated by the drive of the organism to 
achieve equilibrium.37 Counter to empiricist and intellectualist positions, 
according to which attention merely clarifĳies what is already given, Merleau-
Ponty suggests that attention inaugurates that primordial reciprocity by which 
we come into existence as subjects (PP, 53). 
The process can be interpreted in view of Number 1, 1949. When the beholder 
attends to center of the painting, another efffect gradually modifĳies the homog-
enous, de-diffferentiated perceptual fĳield I described above. It is not exactly 
that the center of the painting becomes a zone of clarity, but that an elliptical 
area around the center of the painting, about four feet across, appears as an 
area of relative stability, set offf against a fringe of amorphous or unstructured 
activity that appears to surround it. Much of this has to do with the way Pollock 
leaves the corner zones relatively sparse of pictorial incident, yet fastens the 
web to those corners with loops whose tightness contrasts with the compara-
tive looseness of linear tracery in the middle zone. The recession of the web 
from the corners of the frame and the consequent kneading-in of space at 
those zones makes them salient for the whole. The faint structure given by this 
37) For William James, attention is a “reactive spontaneity,” and thus “experience is what [we] 
agree to attend to” (see Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. [New York: Dover, 1950], 1:402). He contin-
ues: “[E]ach of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of universe he 
shall appear to himself to inhabit” (1:424). 
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perceived ellipse slightly counters the allover quality of the surface.38 In 1956, 
Sam Hunter noticed a quality of Pollock’s works that seems to hold especially 
in this case: “It is as if Pollock’s fĳine lyricism must repeatedly be wrested free 
from the anonymous seething of brute, pigment matter. Yet, powered by an 
intense dynamism . . . , structure break[s] through and rise[s] out of the primal 
disorder . . . at the origin of Pollock’s world.”39 
Perhaps another way to put it is to say that the efffect of visual degradation 
in Number 1, 1949 is achieved as if in opposition both to a sense of the perceived 
limits of the image (where it appears to end) and to a sense of the picture’s 
physical edges, its frame (where it literally ends). Simply put, the surface’s de-
diffferentiation, its uniformity and lack of hierarchy, compromises the power of 
its external boundaries, perceived or literal, to establish pictorial structure. At 
the same time, though, the internal framing of the ovoid provides a certain 
emergent structure to the image that restores to the painting a degree of picto-
rial cohesiveness that is more or less independent of both its perceived limits 
and the literal frame, as if the pictorial structure is now understood to be gen-
erated from the inside out, from the interior of the image to its frame, rather 
than the other way around.40 
The relationship between the viewer’s perception of this structure and the 
specifĳic manner in which the painting solicits this perception is reciprocal in 
the sense that it is not merely given (as if the painting were a stimulus 
causing an automatic response) but is achieved through an act of attention. 
38) William Rubin (following Clement Greenberg) made an important formal connection 
between the kind of fading away from the frame I am describing and the way the scafffolding of 
the 1911–12 works of Picasso and Braque tended to fade away from three edges of their paintings 
(usually excepting the bottom edge). But perhaps more importantly, Rubin indicated their con-
nection to Piet Mondrian’s seascapes and facades of 1913–14 (notably his “Pier and Ocean” series), 
where the “dissolution of the scafffolding near the edge is consistently carried out on all four sides” 
(“Jackson Pollock and the Modern Tradition: Part III,” Artforum 5 [April 1967], 18–31; here 21). The 
artist Tony Smith testifĳied on two occasions to Pollock’s own afffĳirmation of the precise connec-
tion to Mondrian (see Rubin, 23; and E.A. Carmean, Jr. “Jackson Pollock: Classic Paintings of 1950,” 
American Art at Mid-Century [Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1978], 127–53; 150 and 
153n73, and Landau, Jackson Pollock, 196 and 262n28). On these and related points, see Michael 
Schreyach, “Pollock’s Formalist Spaces,” Nonsite 2, no. 7 (October 11, 2012) (http://nonsite.org/
article/pollocks-formalist-spaces).
39) Sam Hunter, “Jackson Pollock: The Maze and the Minotaur,” in New World Writing: Ninth 
Mentor Selection (New York: New American Library, 1956), 174–92; 190–91.
40) For a discussion of related issues in the work of Cézanne and Picasso, see Charles Palermo, 
“A Project for Wholeness,” in Eik Kahng et al., Picasso and Braque: The Cubist Experiment, 1910–1912 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Santa Barbara Museum of Art, 2011), 15–37. 
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Solicitation and response are bound in a productive interplay that does not 
isolate the person who senses (the sensor) from that which is sensed (the sen-
sible). In Merleau-Ponty’s words,
The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually external 
terms. . . . [In] [the] transaction between the subject of sensation and the sensible it cannot 
be held that one acts while the other sufffers the action, or that one confers signifĳicance on 
the other. . . . [A] sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled 
problem for my body to solve. I must fĳind the attitude which will provide it with the means 
of becoming determinate. . . . I must fĳind the reply to a question which is obscurely expressed. 
And yet I do so only when I am invited by it. (PP, 214)41
The initial de-diffferentiation of Number 1, 1949 is the muddled problem that the 
perception of this ellipse solves. In addition—and to switch gears somewhat—
I want further to suggest that this solution (if that is the right word) might 
cause the viewer to become aware of, or to draw, a crucial distinction between 
two competing notions of pictorial structure. The fĳirst depends upon the 
degree to which the composition of elements within an array is seen to be 
adjusted to an external limit, specifĳically to the literal frame (I will call this 
notion “framed”). The second depends on a qualitative diffference between 
how the total array, the allover visual fĳield—which is something more than 
just the accumulation of separate marks—relates to that literal frame (I will 
use the term “format” to signify the qualitative diffference). If she attends to the 
framed structure, the viewer might see the painting in one of two ways. Either 
she projects a narrative of Pollock’s physical interaction with his surfaces—
and perhaps senses his “easy give and take” with his paintings—by taking his 
marks to represent the coordination and reciprocity involved in creating 
them.42 Or, alternatively, she might take the relations between those elements 
and each other (and to the frame) to index mere automatic reactions, with the 
result that Pollock’s fĳield threatens to be understood as the product of mechan-
ical cause and efffect, of sheer stimulus and reflex response—not as an instance 
of the spontaneous, creative expression of depth. 
To understand those marks either as visualizing reciprocity or else as index-
ing cause and efffect opposes the interpretation I would like to propose. I have 
been insisting that Pollock expressed something about how pre-reflective, 
41) Merleau-Ponty was speaking specifĳically about the problem of color here, but I think it can be 
extended to the property of structure as well. Cf. Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Begin-
nings, 76–77.
42) Pollock, “My Painting,” JPI, 18.
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embodied intentionality might come to be coordinated reciprocally with an 
emergent setting, a world (here, the physical limits of the canvas surface), and 
it is here that the notion of format comes into play. In attending to format, 
viewers might also recognize that the particular marks, lines, pools, smudges, 
colors, and viscosities that may appear either as automatic signs or as indica-
tions of coordination are also subsumed by the web as part of the painting’s 
allover visual fĳield. And this fĳield has a diffferent relation to the frame than do 
the marks that constitute it. Above, I suggested that the de-diffferentiation of 
Number 1, 1949 was countered by an elliptical structure apprehended when the 
gaze of a viewer focuses on the center of the fĳield, a structure that creates the 
sense of the painting as a whole. I would now like to suggest that the constitu-
tion of that totality is format. It is as if format, as a representational possibility—
that is, as a structure that functions as a medium to convey expressive content, 
versus a merely literal shape—is to be understood itself as emergent from the 
fĳigurative depth of the fĳield, not given beforehand.43 On this account, format is 
the medium through which the expression of pre-reflective, embodied inten-
tionality is achieved and through which reflective consciousness might “grasp 
its full signifĳicance” as intertwined with and emergent from a pre-objective 
setting (PP, 242).
Automatism and Embodied Intentionality 
Pollock’s technical facility—think of it as an exceptional coordination of bodily 
kinesthetics (comprised of both conscious actions as well as unconscious 
automatisms) with the physical properties of his materials, along with a recog-
nition of the representational possibilities such a coordination creates—
enabled him to produce complex compositions within a framed area. Yet he 
produced something more than just a virtuoso example of composing multiple 
and seemingly infĳinitely varied elements positioned in relation to one another 
and to the literal frame of his canvases (no matter how interesting a viewer 
might fĳind such compositions to be). Pollock also achieved format in the spe-
cial sense in which I have been using the term: he reveals to a beholder a visual 
fĳield that, far from being an accumulation of marks that are taken as traces or 
indexes of his movements or actions above the canvas, is expressive of the 
43) Aspects of my analysis follow Fried’s lead in “Shape as Form: Frank Stella’s Irregular 
Polygons,” reprinted in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 77–99. 
 M. Schreyach / Research in Phenomenology 43 (2013) 49–70 69
creative intentionality of the body’s conscious actions and its automatisms. 
The two levels are interfused.44 
Automatism here appears in an unusual way. Pollock’s automatism, like 
that associated with the Abstract Expressionists generally, is usually under-
stood as an appropriation of surrealist automatism, itself understood as a tech-
nique for generating unconventional imagery. The term covers a set of 
deliberately employed techniques or procedures and is taken to be the means 
by which an artist circumvents her usual sense of intentional activity in order 
to access a level of experience ‘beyond’ or ‘below’ it.45 It is not my motivation 
here to review the complexities of that historical appropriation. Rather, I want 
to suggest that thinking of automatism as merely a technique—either one that 
is consciously utilized to circumvent skill and control in the creation of novel 
imagery, or that actually induces in the artist a mental or physical state that 
suppresses reflection or conscious control—has adverse consequences for 
understanding Number 1, 1949. Automatism, if it is to be interpreted—if it is to 
mean anything at all—must be taken, however paradoxical it initially sounds, 
as represented in Pollock’s work, and as expressed by it. In Number 1, 1949, 
automatism is expressed as the basic intentionality of our situation in the 
world, analogous to pre-objective depth.46 
Considered as a mode of mental or bodily comportment, of general direct-
edness, this modifĳied understanding of automatism might share something 
44) In his discussion of Courbet’s The Quarry (1856–57), Fried argues that in all acts and states 
“will and automatism are interfused”; Courbet calls into question the “absoluteness of the distinc-
tion between automatism and volition” (Courbet’s Realism, 280). I follow Fried on this point, 
although I substitute Merleau-Ponty’s “intentionality” for Fried’s “volition.” 
45) In contrast to this narrow view, Charles Palermo offfers a compelling account of automatism 
in Fixed Ecstasy: Joan Miró in the 1920s (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2008), esp. 82–96. For historical perspectives see William Seitz, Abstract Expressionist Painting in 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) and Irving Sandler, The Triumph of 
American Painting (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
46) My analysis here is not the same as, but shares features with, Stanley Cavell’s. Cavell speaks of 
discovering an artistic medium—which is not the same thing as its material basis—as discover-
ing an “automatism.” An artist who “investigat[es] what it is at any time that has provided a given 
work of art with the power of its art as such” is capable of creating a medium, an automatism—in 
short, of making compelling art. In addition, Cavell suggests that the point of this investigation is 
“to free [the artist] not merely from [his] confĳinement in automatisms that [he] can no longer 
acknowledge as [his own] [i.e., those given by tradition] . . . but to free the object from [the artist], 
to give new ground for its autonomy.” He succinctly put the point with regard to Pollock: “The 
surrealists looked for automatisms which would create images; Pollock looked for an automatism 
with which to create paintings” (Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1979), 107–8.
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with pre-reflective experience, with what Merleau-Ponty called a “generalized 
‘I think’ ” in which the self is “a fĳield, an experience.”47 The expression of this 
mode of awareness is what allows its opacity to be acknowledged (but not fully 
transcended) by reflective consciousness.48 Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that 
this opacity does not exist before it is expressed:
The relation of . . . reflection to the unreflective . . . is [a] two-way relationship . . . [T]he 
founding term, or originator . . . is primary in the sense that the originated is presented as a 
determinate or explicit form of the originator, which prevents the [originator] from reab-
sorbing the [originated], and yet the originator is not primary in the empiricist sense and 
the originated is not simply derived from it, since it is through the originated that the origina-
tor is made manifest. (PP, 394) 
Although it confounds easy explication (and ill fĳits conventional modes of aca-
demic argumentation), what Merleau-Ponty attempted to describe and what 
Pollock, in view of the argument I have made, attempted to express pictorially, 
is a movement from something latent to something manifest while neither 
eliminating the original opacity of the latent nor forgetting the rootedness of 
the manifestly expressed in it. For Merleau-Ponty, there simply is no founda-
tional world “before” the one we inhabit. His conception of the pre-objective 
recognizes the spontaneity of meaning. The individual establishes meaning by 
attending to the world, by paying attention, and in so doing constitutes “new 
objects” that make explicit what was before inarticulate. Perhaps this is part of 
the meaning of Number 1, 1949. Pollock’s painting is an originated that enables 
the expression of an originator. It thus opens to a beholder the possibility for 
reflecting on the condition by which a subject emerges from a world, for reflect-
ing on primordial depth, a past which has never been a present.49 
47) PP, 403 and 406. Quoted by Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 66.
48) Sallis points out, however, that Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of a tacit cogito that is to 
be transcended implies a certain immanence or interiority ‘behind’ experience that undermines 
his attempt to move beyond the idea of a constituting consciousness and consciousness-object 
relations. To invoke transcendence, that is, suggests a “recess of pure consciousness which is aloof 
from the world and out of which the transcending movement proceeds” (Phenomenology and the 
Return to Beginnings, 70).
49) The author thanks Claude Cernuschi, Galen Johnson, Pepe Karmel, Michael Kelly, and espe-
cially Todd Cronan and Charles Palermo for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
